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Abstract
We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the collusion channel are
unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the
capability to trace back pirated copies to the colluders.
Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a sequence of maximin games
with mutual information as their payoff functions. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-
point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking
assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show
that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution.
If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprinting alphabet is binary, we show that capacity
decays quadratically with k. Furthermore, we prove rigorously that the asymptotic capacity is 1/(k22 ln 2)
and we confirm our earlier conjecture that Tardos’ choice of the arcsine distribution asymptotically
maximizes the mutual information payoff function while the interleaving attack minimizes it. Along
with the asymptotics, numerical solutions to the game for small k are also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
In view of the ubiquity of digital media and the development of sophisticated piracy tools, it has
become essential to develop a reliable protection scheme for copyrighted content. Digital fingerprinting,
in which the content distributor embeds a uniquely identified fingerprint into each distributed copy, is an
effective way to deter unauthorized redistribution of the content.
Hundreds of years ago, people used the idea of fingerprinting in logarithm tables. Errors were added
intentionally to insignificant decimals that are randomly selected, with each copy having a unique set of
modifications. If someone ever sold his copy illegally, the legal authority could easily trace the guilty
owner (pirate) by looking into the small errors.
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Urbana, IL 61801 USA (e-mail: huang37@illinois.edu; moulin@ifp.uiuc.edu). This work was supported by the National Science
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2Digital content (e.g., images, videos, audios, programs, etc.) can be protected using the same idea.
One common approach is to embed fingerprints using digital watermarking techniques. Similar to the
logarithm tables discussed above, the fingerprints should not impair the quality or the functionality of
the contents. Most watermarking systems are even robust against attacks such as compression, digital-
to-analog conversions, or intentional noise adding.
The most dangerous attack against fingerprinting, however, is a collusion attack. A group of experienced
pirates can form a coalition, detect the fingerprints by inspecting the marks in each copy, and create a
forgery that has only weak traces of their fingerprints. For the logarithm table example, if the errors are
sparse and chosen randomly, the coalition can easily correct these errors by comparing several different
copies of the logarithm table. Notice that since the pirates cannot remove the errors in which all their
copies coincide, it is still possible for the distributor to design the marks so that at least one of the pirates
can be caught (with possibly certain risk of falsely accusing someone). Yet it should be apparent that
if the size of coalition is large, it is very hard to trace back to the fingerprinted copies from which the
forgery was generated.
To specify the type of manipulations the coalition is capable of, different models have been adopted
in designing the collusion-resistant fingerprinting codes. The distortion constraint is a natural model for
fingerprinting on multimedia contents [1], [2], [3], [4]. In this work, however, we adopt another setup
introduced by Boneh and Shaw in [5], called the marking assumption, which is commonly used both in
multimdeia fingerprinting [6] and software fingerprinting [7]. Under this setup, the fingerprint sequence
that each user receives is represented by a string of marks. By comparing their available copies, the
colluders can modify the detected marks, but cannot modify those marks at which their copies agree. It
should be noted that there exist several versions of the marking assumption specifying different strength
of attacks the colluders can perform [8], and our analysis is general and applies to all these variants.
A. Previous Work
One of the first designs of fingerprinting codes that are resistant to collusion attacks is presented
by Boneh and Shaw [5]. It was shown in [5] that a deterministic binary fingerprinting code with zero
probability of decoding error does not exist. Hence, it becomes necessary for the construction of the
fingerprinting codes to use some form of randomization, where the random key is shared only between
the encoder and the decoder. They also provided the first example of codes with vanishing error probability.
Tardos in 2003 [9] constructed fingerprinting codes of length at most 100k2 ln(m/ǫ) for m users with
error probability at most ǫ against k pirates. This construction yields k-secure fingerprinting schemes
with ǫ-error of rate
[
k2100 ln(2/ǫ)
]−1
. The same paper gave an Ω
(
k2 log(1/ǫ)
)
bound on the length of
any fingerprinting code with the above parameters. The constant 100 in the length 100k2 ln(m/ǫ) was
subsequently improved by several papers [10], [11], [8], [12]. Amiri and Tardos recently [13] further
improved the rate by constructing a code based on a two-person zero-sum game.
A few researchers have also studied the problem from the information-theoretic point of view [1], [4],
[7], [13]. Here the main objective is to find the maximum achievable rate, or capacity, of the fingerprinting
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3system. We denote capacity by Ck where k is the maximum coalition size. For the binary alphabet, Tardos’
construction suggested that Ck ≥ (k2100 ln 2)−1. Anthapadmanabhan et al. [7] proved that Ck = O(1/k).
Recently, Moulin [4] provided the exact formula of capacity in a general setup that unifies the signal-
distortion and Boneh-Shaw formulations of fingerprinting. The formula can be regarded as the limit value
of a sequence of maximin games, which, however, is extremely difficult to evaluate in general.
Two families of fingerprinting decoding scheme are also introduced in [4]: simple decoding and joint
decoding. The breakthrough of Tardos’ randomized fingerprinting code in [9] and its subsequent works
belong to the class of simple decoders. It falls short of the capacity-achieving goal: reliable performance
is impossible at code rates greater than some value Csimplek that is strictly less than the capacity Ck. Yet
the simple and efficient algorithm makes it desirable for practical use. On the other hand, Amiri and
Tardos’ recent work [13] belonged to the joint decoding scheme. Although capacity-achieving, it is much
more complex than the simple decoding scheme and is only useful when computation is not an issue.
Another example of joint decoding is Dumer’s work in [14], where additional constraints are imposed
in the analysis.
B. Main Results
Our work follows the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption. For both joint and simple decoding, we
reformulate the maximum achievable rates of both schemes as the respective maximin values of two
two-person zero-sum games. We further show that the maximin and minimax values of the games are
always equal, and the values are achieved by saddle-point solutions.
In the binary alphabet case, new capacity bounds are provided in closed-form expressions. The ratio
between the upper and lower bounds of the joint decoding scheme is π2/2, while that of the simple
decoding scheme is only π2/4 (for large k). These bounds not only show that the binary fingerprinting
capacity is in Θ(1/k2), but they also provide secure strategies for both players of the game. Numerical
solutions for small k are also presented in comparison with the bounds.
Asymptotic analysis for large coalitions is based on a mild regularity assumption. When k is large, the
fingerprinting game for joint decoding approximates a continuous-kernel game, whose optimal-achieving
strategies can be solved explicitly as the arcsine distribution and the interleaving attack. Finally, we give
a higher level interpretation from the standpoint of statistical decision theory.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Sec. II, we introduce our fingerprinting model and formally
define fingerprinting capacity. The capacity formulas derived in [4] are briefly reviewed and reformulated
in Sec. III. Sec. IV and Sec. V are devoted to the binary alphabet case and Sec. VI gives a brief summary.
C. Notation
We use capital letters to represent random variables, and lowercase letters to their realizations. Boldface
denotes vectors, and calligraphic letters denote finite sets. For example, X ∈ X n denotes a random vector
(X1, . . . ,Xn), with each Xi taking values in X . The probability distribution of X is characterized by
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4its distribution function PX(x) , Pr(X1 ≤ x1, . . . ,Xn ≤ xn). If the distribution is discrete, we also
describe it by its probability mass function (pmf) pX(x) , Pr(X = x). Otherwise if PX has the form
PX(x) =
∫ x1
−∞
· · ·
∫ xn
−∞
fX(x)dx1 . . . dxn
then we characterize the distribution by its probability density function (pdf) fX. Mathematical expectation
of a function g(X) with respect to PX is defined by
EPX [(g(X)] ,
∫
g(x)P (dx).
The mutual information of X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ). Should the
dependency on the underlying pmf’s be explicit, we write the pmf’s as subscripts, e.g. HpX (X) and
IpXpY |X (X;Y ). Given a pair of sequences (x,y), we denote by I(x;y) the empirical mutual information
of the joint pmf pxy. We also denote the binary entropy function by h(p) , −p log p− (1−p) log(1−p)
and h(p) = (h(p1), . . . , h(pn))′. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between two pmf’s p and q is denoted
by D(p ‖ q), and the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two Bernoulli random variables with respective
expectations p and q is denoted by d(p‖q) , p log p
q
+(1−p) log 1−p1−q , where log denotes base 2 logarithm
and ln denotes natural logarithm throughout the paper.
Sequences are denoted by 〈·〉. The size or cardinality of a finite set A is denoted by |A|. The indicator
function of a subset A of a set X is a function 1A : X → {0, 1} defined as
1A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 if x /∈ A .
The power set of a finite set X , denoted by 2X , is the set of all subsets of X , including the empty set
and X itself. The support of a probability distribution P , denoted by supp(P ), is the smallest set whose
complement has probability zero. The support of a family P of probability distributions, denoted by
supp(P), is the union of the support of each probability distribution in the family, i.e.,
⋃
P∈P supp(P ).
Asymptotic notations are defined as follows: Suppose f(k) and g(k) are two functions defined on
positive real numbers. We say f(k) = O(g(k)) if ∃c1 > 0, k1 > 0 such that f(k) ≤ c1g(k),∀k ≥ k1.
Also, f(k) = Ω(g(k)) if ∃c2 > 0, k2 > 0 such that f(k) ≥ c2g(k),∀k ≥ k2. We write f(k) = Θ(g(k))
if f(k) = O(g(k)) and f(k) = Ω(g(k)). The expression f(k) = o(g(k)) or f(k) = ω(g(k)) means that
f(k)/g(k) tends to 0 or ∞ respectively. The shorthand f ∼ g, f & g, and f . g denote the asymptotic
relations limk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
= 1, lim infk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
≥ 1, and lim supk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
≤ 1 respectively.
II. FINGERPRINTING CODES AND CAPACITY
A. Overview
The model for our fingerprinting system is shown in Fig. 1. Let X = {0, 1, . . . , q− 1} denote a size-q
fingerprint alphabet and let M = {1, . . . ,m} denote the set of user indices. An (n,m) fingerprinting
code (en, dn) over X consists of an encoder and a decoder. The encoder
en :M×Vn → X n (1)
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Fig. 1. Fingerprinting system model under the marking assumption
assigns user i a length-n fingerprint Xi, where Vn is the alphabet of the secret key Vn, which is a random
variable whose realization is known to the encoder and the decoder, but unknown to the pirates.
We denote by K , {i1, . . . , iK} the index set of a coalition of K pirates and XK = {Xi : i ∈ K}
as the fingerprints available to them. The collusion channel produces the forgery Y ∈ Yn according
to some conditional probability mass function (pmf) pY|XK . The Boneh-Shaw marking assumption is
imposed on pY|XK , which allows the colluders to change only the symbols at the positions where they
find differences.
Not knowing the actual collusion channel pY|XK , the decoder
dn : Y × Vn → 2M (2)
produces an estimate Kˆ of the coalition. Note that the actual number of pirates K is known neither to
the encoder nor to the decoder, so the code design is based on a nominal coalition size k. Also note
that the empty set ∅ is an admissible decoder output, which enables us not to accuse any user when no
enough evidence is available to the decoder, especially when the actual K is larger than k.
B. Randomized Fingerprinting Codes
The formal definition of an ensemble of fingerprinting codes is as follows.
Definition 1. A fingerprinting ensemble (En,Dn) is formed by the fingerprinting embedder randomly
choosing from a family {en(·, vn), dn(·, vn), vn ∈ Vn} of (n,m) fingerprinting codes according to some
probability distribution on the set Vn of keys.
We assume that the family of fingerprinting codes and the probability distribution on Vn are known to
the public, but the realization vn is only known to the encoder and the decoder.
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6As shown in [4], it suffices to consider the following two-phase fingerprinting construction and
joint/simple decoding scheme in studying capacity. The secret key Vn shared by the encoder and the
decoder in this scheme is the set of random variables {Wj}nj=1 ∪ (Xi,j)m×n.
1) Encoding Scheme: Let PW be a probability distribution on the (q − 1)-dimensional simplex
W
q ,
{
w ∈ Rq :
q−1∑
x=0
wx = 1 and 0 ≤ wx ≤ 1, x ∈ X
}
. (3)
A sequence of auxiliary “time-sharing” random variables {Wj}nj=1 is drawn independent and identically
from the distribution PW. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, {Xi,j}mi=1 are m independent and identically
distributed random variables constructed from a categorical distribution1 with parameter Wj , i.e.,
Pr (X1,j = x1, . . . ,Xm,j = xm|Wj = w) =
m∏
i=1
wxi , ∀x1, . . . , xm ∈ X . (4)
In general, there is no constraint on the choice of the embedding distribution PW, which means that
we can choose it from the class of all probability distributions on W q, denoted by PW. However, we
may want to limit PW to a subclass Pe of PW in some applications. For instance, Nuida et al. [10]
limited PW to be discrete with a finite spectrum. Furon and Perez-Freire [6] studied the case when PW
is the arcsine distribution (defined below) or the uniform distribution over the unit interval for binary
fingerprinting codes, in which Pe is just a singleton.
In most of our results we require Pe to be compact. In some results we also require the following
condition. Note that Pe satisfying (5) is compact.
Condition 1. Pe coincides with the class of all probability distributions on supp(Pe), i.e.,
P
e = {PW ∈ PW : supp(PW) ⊆ supp(Pe)} . (5)
Analogous to the symbol-symmetric fingerprinting codes proposed by ˇSkoric´ et al. [8], it is intuitively
reasonable to adopt a probability distribution PW that is invariant to permutations of the symbols.
Formally, let π be a permutation of X and define
P piW(w0, . . . , wq−1) , PW(wpi(0), . . . , wpi(q−1)). (6)
Then we have
Definition 2. An embedding distribution PW is symbol-symmetric if
P piW = PW, ∀π. (7)
Definition 3. A subset Pe of PW is said to be symbol-symmetric if
PW ∈ Pe ⇒ P piW ∈ Pe, ∀π. (8)
1The categorical distribution is a special case of the multinomial distribution with the number of trials set to 1.
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7Definition 4. The symbol-symmetric subclass of an embedding class Pe is defined by
P
e
sym = {PW ∈ Pe : PW is symbol-symmetric} . (9)
The optimality of limiting PW to Pesym will be discussed in the next section.
2) Decoding Scheme: We briefly review Moulin’s two decoding schemes proposed in [4]: the simple
decoder tests candidate fingerprints one by one, while the joint decoder utilizes a joint decoding rule.
The simple decoder evaluates the empirical mutual information I(xi;y|w) for each user i. A threshold
ηsimple is chosen and user i is accused if and only if I(xi;y|w) > ηsimple. If I(xi;y|w) ≤ ηsimple for
all i ∈ M, then Kˆ = ∅. The joint decoder evaluates the following score for each coalition A ⊆M
S(A) =
{
0, if A = ∅
I(xA;y|w) − |A|ηjoint, otherwise
(10)
where ηjoint is a threshold. The set A that has the largest score is then accused. With the parameters
ηsimple and ηjoint, both decoders allow to tune the trade-offs between false positive and false negative
error probabilities.
It is shown in [4] that the joint decoding scheme achieves capacity while the simple decoding scheme
has a smaller maximum achievable rate. However, the computational complexity of a joint decoder is
generally vastly greater than that of a simple decoder.
C. Collusion Channel
Upon receiving the K fingerprinting copies {Xi1 , . . . ,XiK}, the pirates attempt to generate a forgery
Y subject to the marking assumption. A coordinate j is called undetectable if
xi1,j = xi2,j = · · · = xiK ,j (11)
and is called detectable otherwise. The Boneh-Shaw marking assumption states that for any forgery y
generated by the coalition, we have yj = xi1,j for every undetectable coordinate j.
We assume the collusion channel pY|XK adopted by the pirates is memoryless, that is,
pY|XK(y|xK) =
n∏
j=1
pY |XK(yj |xK,j). (12)
As exploited in [4], the memoryless restriction can be relaxed without changing the fingerprinting capacity.
For simplicity we impose this constraint so the colluders’ strategy is limited to the choice of the single-
lettered channel pY |XK . Denoted by Pmark, the class of attacks satisfying the marking assumption can
be written as
Pmark = {pY |XK : pY |XK(y|xK) = 1 if y = xi1 = xi2 = · · · = xiK}. (13)
Several variants of the marking assumption appear in the literature. Suppose Pc denotes the class
of admissible channels pY |XK . Some restrict the coalition to use only the symbols available to them,
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8where Pc = {pY |XK ∈ Pmark : pY |XK(y|xK) = 0 if y 6= xi,∀i ∈ K} (usually called the restricted digit
model). Others relax the alphabet Y to X ∪ {‘?’}, which allows the pirates to put erasures at detectable
coordinates (usually called the general digit model). Here we consider a general Pc with Pc ⊆ Pmark
being compact.
Given a single-lettered collusion channel pY |XK , consider the user-permuted collusion channel
pY |Xpi(K)(y|xi1 , . . . , xiK ) , pY |XK(y|xpi(i1), . . . , xpi(iK)) (14)
where π is a permutation of K. We say that pY |XK is user-symmetric if
pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀π. (15)
A subset Pc of Pmark is said to be user-symmetric if
pY |XK ∈ Pc ⇒ pY |Xpi(K) ∈ Pc, ∀π. (16)
Note that in general not all elements of such Pc are user-symmetric. The user-symmetric subclass of
a collusion class Pc that consists of user-symmetric collusion channels is defined by
P
c
fair = {pY |XK ∈ Pc : pY |XK is user-symmetric}. (17)
Symbol-symmetry can also be defined for collusion channels. Let π be a permutation of X and define
ppiY |XK(y|xi1 , . . . , xiK ) , pY |XK(y|π(xi1), . . . , π(xiK )). (18)
Then we have
Definition 5. A collusion channel pY |XK is symbol-symmetric if
ppiY |XK = pY |XK, ∀π. (19)
Definition 6. A subset Pc of Pmark is said to be symbol-symmetric if
pY |XK ∈ Pc ⇒ ppiY |XK ∈ Pc, ∀π. (20)
Definition 7. The symbol-symmetric subclass of a collusion class Pc is defined by
P
c
sym =
{
pY |XK ∈ Pc : pY |XK is symbol-symmetric
}
. (21)
D. Error Probabilities and Capacity
Under fingerprinting ensemble (En,Dn), nominal coalition size k (not necessarily equal to the true
coalition size K), and collusion channel pY |XK , we consider the following error probabilities:
• The probability of false positives (accusing an innocent user):
PFPe (En,Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
Kˆ \ K 6= ∅
)
. (22)
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9• The probability of failing to catch any single pirate:
P onee (En,Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
Kˆ ∩ K = ∅
)
. (23)
• The probability of failing to catch the full coalition:
P alle (En,Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
K * Kˆ
)
. (24)
The error probabilities above can be written explicitly as
Pe(En,Dn, pY |XK) =
∑
xM,y
n∏
j=1
∫
PW(dwj)
(
m∏
i=1
wxi,j
)
pY |XK(yj |xK,j)1E (25)
where the error event E is given by EFP = {dn(y, vn) \ K 6= ∅}, Eone = {dn(y, vn) ∩K = ∅}, and
Eall = {K * dn(y, vn)}, when Pe is given by (22), (23), and (24) respectively. The worst-case error
probability for a collusion class is given by
Pe,k(En,Dn,P
c) = max
K⊆M
|K|≤k
max
pY |XK∈P
c
Pe
(
En,Dn, pY |XK
)
. (26)
Having defined the error probabilities of the randomized fingerprinting scheme, we now define the
notion of capacity.
Definition 8. A rate R is achievable for embedding class Pe, collusion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions
under the detect-one criterion if there exists a sequence of fingerprinting ensembles (Fn, Gn) generated
by PW ∈ Pe for m = ⌈2nR⌉ users such that both PFPe,k (En,Dn,Pc) and P onee,k (En,Dn,Pc) vanish as
n tends to infinity.
Definition 9. A rate R is achievable for embedding class Pe, collusion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions
under the detect-all criterion if there exists a sequence of fingerprinting ensembles (Fn, Gn) generated
by PW ∈ Pe for m = ⌈2nR⌉ users such that both PFPe,k (En,Dn,Pc) and P alle,k(En,Dn,Pc) vanish as
n goes to infinity.
Definition 10. Fingerprinting capacities Conek (Pe,Pc) and Callk (Pe,Pc) are the suprema of all
achievable rates with respect to the detect-one and detect-all criteria, respectively.
Remark 1. When the embedding class Pe is a singleton {PW} or the collusion class Pc is a singleton
{pY |XK}, we denote the corresponding capacities as Ck(PW, ·) and Ck(·, pY |XK) respectively, which is
a slight abuse of notation.
III. MUTUAL INFORMATION GAMES
In this section we first review the mutual information games associated with both the joint and
the simple decoding schemes in [4]. We show how these games can be simplified under the marking
assumption, and we show the existence of saddle-point solutions.
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A. Mutual Information Game for Joint Decoder
We use the special symbol K to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k is the nominal coalition size
introduced in Sec. II-A. To present the capacity formula, we first introduce the following setup: for a
fixed embedding class Pe, let
P
e
l , {pW ∈ Pe : |supp(pW)| ≤ l} (27)
be the class of probability distributions with finite spectrum composed of no more than l points of the
(q − 1)-dimensional simplex W q. A random variable W is drawn from some pW ∈ Pel , and {Xi}ki=1
are independent and identically distributed with categorical distribution with parameter W, i.e.,
pXK|W(xK|w) =
k∏
i=1
pX|W(xi|w) (28)
where
pX|W(x|w) = wx, x ∈ X .
The collusion class Pc is the set of all feasible channels pY |XK . Let
C joint,lk (P
e,Pc) = max
pW∈Pel
min
pY |X
K
∈Pc
1
k
I(XK;Y |W). (29)
The following theorem summarizes the main results of fingerprinting capacity proposed in [4] under the
marking assumption.
Theorem 1. Assume that Condition 1 is satisfied and Pc is compact. Then
1) Callk (Pe,Pc) ≤ Conek (Pe,Pc). In particular, the detect-all fingerprinting capacity Callk (Pe,Pmark)
under the marking assumption is zero.
2) Suppose further that Pc is user-symmetric, then
Conek (P
e,Pc) = Conek (P
e,Pcfair) = C
all
k (P
e,Pcfair) = lim
l→∞
C joint,lk (P
e,Pc). (30)
Theorem 1 states that, the detect-all capacity can never exceed the detect-one capacity, which is no
surprise since it can only be harder for the decoder to detect all the pirates than to detect only one of
the pirates. However, if the collusion channel is user-symmetric, which we can intuitively think of as
the case when each colluder “contributes” the same number of samples to the forgery (hence the term
“fair”), then the detect-one and the detect-all capacities are the same.
Now since the detect-all capacity is null under the marking assumption, we will in the rest of the paper
refer to the detect-one capacity Conek (Pe,Pc), denoted by C
joint
k (P
e,Pc), as the joint fingerprinting
capacity for embedding class Pe and collusion channel Pc.
In the game-theoretic point of view, C joint,lk is the maximin value of a two-person zero-sum game for
each l. Observe that the sequence 〈C joint,lk 〉∞l=1 is nondecreasing since 〈Pel 〉∞l=1 is nondecreasing (i.e.
Pe1 ⊆ Pe2 ⊆ · · · ). Thus the game can be interpreted as the following: the maximizer, the fingerprint
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embedder, picks pW with an increasing flexibility in the support size, while the minimizer, the coali-
tion, counters the embedder’s choice for each l by minimizing the mutual information payoff function.
Fingerprinting capacity is the limit value of the sequence of maximin games.
However, the maximin game of (29) is in general very difficult to solve even for small values of l
since a saddle-point solution cannot be guaranteed. For the binary alphabet (q = 2) and l = 1, we can
derive the maximin value as
C joint,1k (PW,Pmark) =
1
k
2−(k−1) (31)
which is not achieved by a saddle-point solution when k > 2. Also, this is a very loose lower bound on
C jointk (PW,Pmark) for large k comparing to the Θ(k−2) bound we will show in Sec. IV-C.
B. Mutual Information Game for Simple Decoder
As mentioned in Sec. II-B, computationally joint decoding is too complex. Thus it is also interesting
to study the maximum achievable rate of the simple decoding scheme.
Theorem 2. Assume that Condition 1 is satisfied and Pc is compact and user-symmetric. Let
Csimple,lk (P
e,Pc) = max
pW∈Pel
min
pY |X
K
∈Pcfair
I(X1;Y |W) (32)
for l ≥ 1 and let
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) = lim
l→∞
Csimple,lk (P
e,Pc). (33)
Then all rates below Csimplek (Pe,Pc) are achievable by the simple decoding scheme for embedding
class Pe, collusion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions under the detect-one criterion.
Corollary 1. For Pe satisfying Condition 1 and compact and user-symmetric Pc, we have
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) ≤ C jointk (Pe,Pc). (34)
Proof: See [4].
Although we do not have a notion of capacity for the quantity Csimplek , it will be referred to as the
“simple” fingerprinting capacity as opposed to the joint fingerprinting discussed in the previous subsection.
C. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games of Fingerprinting Capacity
To establish the desired saddle-point property, we first reformulate both the joint and the simple
fingerprinting capacities as the respective values of the following two fingerprinting maximin games.
Theorem 3. Assume that Condition 1 is satisfied and Pc is compact and user-symmetric. Then
C jointk (P
e,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |X
K
∈Pc
1
k
I(XK;Y |W) (35)
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and
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |X
K
∈Pcfair
I(X1;Y |W). (36)
Proof:
Let
I jointk (w, pY |XK) =
1
k
IpY |X
K
(XK;Y |W = w) (37)
and let
Isimplek (w, pY |XK) = IpY |XK (X1;Y |W = w). (38)
Then the payoff functions of (35) and (36) become EPW
[
I jointk (W, pY |XK)
]
and
EPW
[
Isimplek (W, pY |XK)
]
respectively. Denote also the right-hand sides of (35) and (36) by
C˜ jointk (P
e,Pc) and C˜simplek (Pe,Pc) respectively. The inequality
Ck(P
e,Pc) ≤ C˜k(Pe,Pc) (39)
follows directly from the fact that Pel ⊆ Pe for each l. Now let the optimal achieving distributions for
(35) or (36) be P (k)W and p(k)Y |XK . Then by completeness of Pe, there exists a sequence of distributions
〈plW〉∞l=1 with plW ∈ Pel that converges in distribution to P (k)W . Both the functions I jointk and Isimplek are
bounded and continuous with respect to w. By [15, p.249 Theorem 1] we have
lim
l→∞
Epl
W
[
Ik(W, p
(k)
Y |XK
)
]
= E
P
(k)
W
[
Ik(W, p
(k)
Y |XK
)
]
(40)
and thus
Ck(P
e,Pc) ≥ lim
l→∞
Epl
W
[
Ik(W, p
(k)
Y |XK
)
]
= C˜k(P
e,Pc). (41)
Combining (39) and (41) yields (35) and (36).
Theorem 3 shows that the joint and simple capacities are the maximin values of two single two-person
zero-sum games. Note that the theorem only specifies the capacities when the embedding class Pe
satisfies Condition 1. With slight modification of the proofs in [4], it can be shown that (35) and (36)
still hold for any compact Pe. Furthermore, we can show that the maximin and minimax values of the
games are equal in general, and there are always saddle-point strategies for both players of the games.
We define the minimax values associated with the above games:
Definition 11. The minimax value of the joint fingerprinting game is defined by
C
joint
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |X
K
∈Pc
max
PW∈Pe
EPW
[
I jointk (W, pY |XK)
]
. (42)
Definition 12. The minimax value of the simple fingerprinting game is defined by
C
simple
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |X
K
∈Pcfair
max
PW∈Pe
EPW
[
Isimplek (W, pY |XK)
]
. (43)
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When Condition 1 is satisfied (for example, when Pe = PW), the minimax games can be simplified
as the following:
Lemma 1. Assume that Condition 1 is satisfied. Then the minimax values of the joint and simple
fingerprinting games can be respectively written as
C
joint
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |X
K
∈Pc
max
w∈supp(Pe)
I jointk (w, pY |XK) (44)
and
C
simple
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |X
K
∈Pcfair
max
w∈supp(Pe)
Isimplek (w, pY |XK). (45)
Proof: Note that randomization is no longer necessary for the minimax games of (42) and (43), so
they have the same respective values as (44) and (45).
We now present the main saddle-point property of the fingerprinting games. The results owe to the
convexity of the payoff function with respect to the minimizer’s strategy. Such games are generally called
convex games [16, §2.5].
Theorem 4. For compact Pe, compact and user-symmetric Pc, and for both the joint and simple games,
Ck(P
e,Pc) = Ck(P
e,Pc). Suppose further that Pe and Pc are symbol-symmetric, then the first
argument Pe can be replaced by Pesym and/or the second argument Pc can be replaced by Pcfair, Pcsym,
or Pcfair,sym without changing the minimax or the maximin value. For all these games, the minimizer
has an optimal strategy p(k)
Y |XK
∈ Pcfair,sym while the maximizer has an optimal strategy P (k)W ∈ Pesym.
In particular, when Condition 1 is satisfied, the maximizing strategy p(k)W ∈ Pesym has a finite spectrum.
The values of all these games equal the (joint or simple) fingerprinting capacity Ck(Pe,Pc).
Proof: We show that the functions I jointk and Isimplek are convex functions of pY |XK for fixed w. The
convexity of I jointk is shown in [17, Theorem 2.7.4]. To show the convexity of Isimplek (w, pY |XK), we fix
w and consider two different conditional distributions p1
Y |XK
and p2
Y |XK
. Note that
Isimplek (w, pY |XK) = I(X1;Y |W = w)
=
∑
x,y
pX1|W(x|w)pY |X1W(y|x,w) log
pY |X1W(y|x,w)
pY |W(y|w)
=
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)D(pY |X1W ‖ pY |W|W = w). (46)
For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have
λIsimple(w, p1Y |XK) + (1− λ)Isimple(w, p2Y |XK)
=
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)
[
λD(p1Y |X1W ‖ p1Y |W|W = w) + (1− λ)D(p2Y |X1W ‖ p2Y |W|W = w)
]
≥
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)D(pλY |X1W ‖ pλY |W|W = w)
= Isimple(w, pλY |XK) (47)
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where pλ
Y |XK
= λp1
Y |XK
+(1−λ)p2
Y |XK
∈ Pc by compactness. The inequality follows from the convexity
of relative entropy [17, Theorem 2.7.2]. Hence Isimplek is convex in pY |XK .
Now since Ik(w, pY |XK) is a convex function of pY |XK for fixed w ∈ W q, EPW [Ik(W, pY |XK)] is also
a convex function of pY |XK for fixed PW ∈ PW. On the other hand, EPW [Ik(W, pY |XK)] is a linear
function of PW for fixed pY |XK . By the minimax theorem [18], the game admits a saddle-point solution.
If Pe is symbol-symmetric and let PW be a minimizing saddle-point strategy, then by symbol-
symmetry each P piW ∈ Pe is a minimizing saddle-point strategy for any permutation π of X . The
symbol-permutation averaged distribution
PW =
1
q!
∑
pi
P piW (48)
is also a minimizing saddle-point strategy and is symbol-symmetric by construction. Similarly if Pc is
user-symmetric and symbol-symmetric, we can construct a maximizing saddle-point strategy that is both
user-symmetric and symbol-symmetric.
Finally if Pe is the class of all probability distributions on supp(Pe) (Condition 1), the game becomes
a so-called convex game whose minimizing strategy has a finite spectrum (see [16, §2.5]).
IV. FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY FOR THE BINARY ALPHABET
In the following two sections we study intensively the joint and simple fingerprinting games for the
binary alphabet, i.e. X = Y = {0, 1}.2 Tight upper and lower bounds on capacities are provided under
several different setups.
A. Game Definition
The mutual information games for joint and simple decoder in the binary case can be simplified as
follows:
1) Fingerprinting Codes
The auxiliary random vector W now has only one degree of freedom, and we redefine it as
W ∈ [0, 1]. PW denotes its distribution and pX|W ∼ Bernoulli(W ).
Suppose Pe is compact and symbol-symmetric. Then by Theorem 4, it suffices to consider symbol-
symmetric PW , which in the binary case means that the distribution of W is symmetric about 1/2,
i.e.,
Pr(W ≤ w) = Pr(W ≥ 1− w), w ∈ [0, 1]. (49)
In the numerical results in Sec. V-B, we will consider a subset of the family of beta distributions,
which is a family of continuous probability distributions defined on (0, 1):
f θW (w) =
1
B(θ, θ)
[w(1− w)]θ−1 (50)
2In the case of the binary alphabet, the four variations of the marking assumption discussed in [8] are equivalent in terms of
capacity. Hence for simplicity we assume X = Y .
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where the beta function, B(θ, θ) ,
∫ 1
0 [t(1− t)]θ−1 dt, appears as a normalization constant, and
the parameter θ > 0. The arcsine distribution, which is a special case of the beta distribution with
θ = 1/2, has pdf
f∗W (w) =
1
π
√
w(1 − w) (51)
on (0, 1). The arcsine distribution was first used in generating randomized fingerprinting codes by
Tardos [9] and is sometimes referred to as the “Tardos distribution” in the literature.
2) Collusion Channel
Suppose Pc is compact and user- and symbol-symmetric. Then by Theorem 4 it suffices to consider
user-symmetric attacks. Let Z ,
∑k
i=1Xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, which is the number of 1’s in XK.
User-symmetry makes Z a sufficient statistic in producing Y . If we let p = (p0, . . . , pk)′ where
pz , pY |Z(1|z), z = 0, . . . , k, then the collusion channel can be completely characterized by p.
The marking assumption enforces that
p0 = 0 and pk = 1. (52)
On the other hand, symbol-symmetry allows us to consider p with
pz = 1− pk−z, z = 0, . . . , k. (53)
The interleaving attack p∗ (a.k.a. “uniform channel” in [7] and “blind colluders” in [19]) defined by
p∗z =
z
k
, z = 0, . . . , k (54)
is frequently adopted to model the coalition’s strategy and can be easily implemented by drawing
each yj randomly from x1,j, . . . , xk,j at each position j. One can verify that it satisfies the
marking assumption (52) and is both user- and symbol-symmetric (49). We will further discuss the
performance of this attack in Sec. IV-C and Sec. V.
3) Payoff Functions
Let α(w) = (α0(w), . . . , αk(w))′ and similarily for α1(w) and α0(w) where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z (55)
is the binomial law with parameter w and k trials, and
α1z(w) , pZ|X1W (z|1, w) =
{ (
k−1
z−1
)
wz−1(1− w)k−z, 1 ≤ z ≤ k
0, z = 0
(56)
and
α0z(w) , pZ|X1W (z|0, w) =
{ (
k−1
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z−1, 0 ≤ z ≤ k − 1
0, z = k
(57)
are the (shifted for α1(w)) binomial laws with parameter w and k − 1 trials.
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Recall that W → XK → Z → Y forms a Markov chain. We have
pY |X1W (1|x,w) =
k∑
z=0
pZ|X1W (z|x,w)pY |Z(1|z)
=
k∑
z=0
αxz (w)pz = α
x′p (58)
for x = 0, 1. The payoff function for the joint fingerprinting game is then
I jointk (w,p) =
1
k
I(XK;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
I(Z;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
[H(Y |W = w)−H(Y |Z,W = w)]
=
1
k
[
h
(
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz
)
−
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h(pz)
]
=
1
k
[
h(α′p)−α′h(p)] . (59)
Another representation of I jointk is
I jointk (w,p) =
1
k
D(pZY |W ‖ pZ|WpY |W |W = w)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
1∑
y=0
pZ|W (z|w)pY |Z(y|z) log
pY |Z(y|z)
pY |W (y|w)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w)
[
pz log
pz
α
′p
+ (1− pz) log 1− pz
1−α′p
]
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d(pz ‖ α′p). (60)
For the simple fingerprinting game, we have
Isimplek (w,p) = I(X1;Y |W = w)
= D(pX1Y |W ‖ pX1|W pY |W |W = w)
=
1∑
x=0
1∑
y=0
pX1|W (x|w)pY |X1W (y|x,w) log
pY |X1W (y|x,w)
pY |W (y|w)
= wD(pY |X1=1,W ‖ pY |W ) + (1− w)D(pY |X1=0,W ‖ pY |W )
(a)
= wd(α1
′
p ‖ α′p) + (1− w)d(α0′p ‖ α′p) (61)
where (a) follows from (58).
4) Fingerprinting Games
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The fingerprinting games for the binary alphabet under the marking assumption can now be written
as
Ck(P
e,Pc) = max
PW
min
p
EPW [Ik(W,p)] (62)
= min
p
max
PW
EPW [Ik(W,p)] (63)
where the maximization is subject to PW ∈ Pe and the symbol-symmetry condition (49) while
the minimization is subject to p ∈ Pc and the symbol-symmetry condition (53). The maximizing
and minimizing strategies are denoted by P (k)W and p(k) respectively. If Pe satisfies Condition 1,
then by Lemma 1 we have
Ck(P
e,Pc) = min
p
max
w
Ik(w,p) (64)
where the maximization is subject to w ∈ supp(Pe).
B. Analysis of the Convex Games
We consider the following three cases:
1) Colluders’ Strategy is Fixed
Pc = {p} in this case. For general Pe the game is still an infinite-dimensional maximization
problem. However when Condition 1 is satisfied, it reduces to one-dimensional by (64) and a
simple line search gives us the capacity under collusion channel p. Note that for any p ∈ Pmark,
Ck(P
e,p) is an upper bound on Ck(Pe,Pmark).
2) Fingerprinting Embedder’s Strategy is Fixed
Pe = {PW } in this case. The game reduces to a Θ(k)-dimentional minimization problem. Since the
payoff function EPW [Ik(W,p)] is convex in p, we use the conditional gradient method to solve the
constrained convex optimization problem (62) (see [20]). For the joint fingerprinting game, Furon
and Perez-Freire [6] proposed a Blahut-Arimoto algorithm which, however, cannot be applied to
the simple fingerprinting game. Note that for any PW ∈ PW , Ck(PW ,Pe) is a lower bound on
Ck(PW ,P
e).
3) Fingerprinting Capacities Under the Marking Assumption
We consider specifically Pe = PW and Pc = Pmark. Solving the maximin game of (62) or the
minimax game of (64) is much more difficult than solving the above maximization or minimization
problems. In particular, the alternating maximization and minimization algorithm generally diverges.
Owing to the existence of a saddle-point solution, p(k) and p(k)W (note that it is a pmf by Theorem
4) must satisfy the following:
a) When p = p(k) is fixed, I(w,p(k)) is a differentiable function over the unit interval. The
support supp
(
p
(k)
W
)
of p(k)W can only take values at the maximizers of I(w,p(k)) [16, §2.5].
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Fig. 2. Capacities Ck(PW ,Pmark), Ck(PW ,p∗), Ck(f∗W ,Pmark), and upper and lower bounds of the (a) joint and (b)
simple fingerprinting games
Hence we have 
I(w,p(k)) = Ck(PW ,Pmark)
∂
∂w
I(w,p(k)) = 0
∂2
∂w2
I(w,p(k)) < 0
, ∀w ∈ supp
(
p
(k)
W
)
. (65)
b) When pW = p(k)W is fixed and the constraint (53) is imposed, we have
E
p
(k)
W
[
∂
∂pz
I(W,p(k))
]
= 0, z = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k − 1
2
⌋
. (66)
By the convexity in p of the payoff function, we have
∣∣∣supp(p(k)W )∣∣∣ ≤ ⌊k+12 ⌋ (see [16, §2.5]).
With a fixed spectrum cardinality, we can obtain candidate capacity-achieving strategies p(k)W and
p(k) by solving (65) and (66), and then verify whether those candidate distributions are optimal
by examining the second partial derivatives. Once p(k) and p(k)W are found, we can evaluate
Ck(PW ,Pmark) by substituting them into (62).
Numerical solutions to the joint and simple fingerprinting games are shown in Fig. 2-4. Observe that
capacities for both games (Fig. 2(a)-(b)), the optimal distributions P (k)W for both games (Fig. 3(a)-(b)), and
the optimal attacks p(k) for the joint fingerprinting game (Fig. 4(a)) all seem to converge as k grows. The
optimal attacks p(k) for the simple fingerprinting game (Fig. 4(b)) however exhibit some wild oscillations
in both amplitude and frequency as k grows. We will study the asymptotics of the joint fingerprinting
game for large k in the next section.
C. Capacity Bounds
The analysis of Sec. IV-B allows us to solve the fingerprinting game numerically for small k. However,
evaluating or even approximating the capacity value for large k is still a difficult task. In this subsection,
we provide tight upper and lower bounds on capacity.
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Fig. 4. The interleaving attack p∗ and the optimal attacks p(k) for the (a) joint and (b) simple fingerprinting games under the
marking assumption
For simplicity of notation, we let
gk(w) , pY |W (1|w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz = α(w)
′p (67)
which by the definition of αz(w) in (55) is a polynomial in w of degree ≤ k. Note that gk(0) = p0 = 0
and gk(1) = pk = 1 by the marking assumption.
The following lemmas will be useful for the proofs:
Lemma 2 (Pinsker’s inequality). [17, Lemma 11.6.1]
d(r ‖ s) ≥ 2
ln 2
(r − s)2. (68)
Lemma 3. Equalities
α
1′p−α′p = 1− w
k
g′k(w)
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and
α
0′p−α′p = −w
k
g′k(w)
hold for z = 0, . . . , k and w ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The equalities follow directly from (55), (56), (57), and (67).
Lemma 4. Let fW be a pdf on [0, 1]. Then∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w) ≥ π
2 (69)
with equality if and only if fW is the arcsine distribution of (51).
Proof: By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w) ≥
[∫ 1
0
dw√
w(1−w)
]2
∫ 1
0 fW (w)dw
= π2.
Equality holds if and only if fW (w) ∝ 1√
w(1−w)
, which leads us to the arcsine distribution.
1) Upper Bounds: The following two theorems bound from above capacities under the interleaving
attack of (54).
Theorem 5. [21, Theorem 4.2]
C jointk (PW ,p
∗) ≤ 1
k2 ln 2
. (70)
Proof:
C jointk (PW ,p
∗) = max
w∈[0,1]
I jointk (w,p
∗)
(a)
=
1
k
max
w∈[0,1]
{
h(w) −
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h
( z
k
)}
(b)
≤ 1
k2 ln 2
where (a) follows from (59) and (b) results from [7, Theorem 4.3].
Theorem 6. [22, Proposition 4.2]
Csimplek (PW ,p
∗) = 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2k
)
=
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
. (71)
Proof: It can be shown that Isimplek (w,p∗) takes its maximum at w = 1/2 (See the Appendix).
Hence
Csimplek (PW ,p
∗) = max
w∈[0,1]
Isimplek (w,p
∗)
= 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2k
)
=
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
.
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2) Lower Bounds: The following theorem provides a lower bound on both the joint and simple
capacities under a continuous probability distribution fW .
Theorem 7. Let fW be the pdf of a continuous probability distribution on [0, 1]. Then
C jointk (fW ,Pmark) ≥ Csimplek (fW ,Pmark) ≥
2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 −w)
]−1
. (72)
The lower bound is maximized when fW = f∗W where it takes the value
2
k2π2 ln 2
.
Proof: For any p ∈ Pmark, we have
EfW
[
Isimplek (W,p)
]
(a)
=
∫ 1
0
[
wd(α1
′
p ‖ α′p) + (1− w)d(α0′p ‖ α′p)
]
fW (w)dw
(b)
≥ 2
ln 2
∫ 1
0
[
w(α1
′
p−α′p)2 + (1− w)(α0′p−α′p)2
]
fW (w)dw
(c)
=
2
k2 ln 2
∫ 1
0
[
g′k(w)
]2
w(1− w)fW (w)dw
(d)
≥ 2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0 g
′
k(w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1−w)
(e)
=
2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w)
]−1
.
(a) follows from (61). (b) follows from Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 2). (c) follows from Lemma 3. (d)
follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Finally, (e) follows from the marking assumption. Hence
Csimplek (fW ,Pmark) = min
p∈Pmark
EfW
[
Isimplek (W,p)
]
≥ 2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w)
]−1
.
Following Lemma 4, the lower bound is maximized when fW = f∗W , which coincides with the lower
bound given in [22].
The following corollaries summarizes the upper and lower bounds on capacities under the marking
assumption:
Corollary 2.
2
k2π2 ln 2
≤ C jointk (PW ,Pmark) ≤
1
k2 ln 2
. (73)
Corollary 3.
2
k2π2 ln 2
≤ Csimplek (PW ,Pmark) ≤
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
. (74)
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V. ASYMPTOTICS FOR LARGE COALITIONS
The upper and lower bounds on C jointk (PW ,Pmark) provided in the previous section are within a
factor of about five. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the numerical results suggest that C jointk (PW ,Pmark)
approximates (k22 ln 2)−1 even for small values of k. Amiri and Tardos [13] claimed the same asymptotic
rate but only provided the proof for the lower bound in [23, Theorem 15]. Here we analyze not only this
rate but the complete asymptotics of the joint fingerprinting game.
A. Aymptotic Analysis
We consider the sequence of mutual information games for joint decoding. To study the asymptotics
when k →∞, we first assume that the collusion channel p satisfies the following regularity condition:
Condition 2. There exists a bounded and twice differentiable function g(w) on [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and
g(1) = 1 such that
pz = g
(z
k
)
, ∀z ∈ {0, . . . , k}. (75)
Certainly the condition restricts the colluders’ strategy to a smaller space. We however claim that this
is a very mild limitation on their power for the following reasons:
1) For each k, the collusion channels take values of g at only the lattice points in [0, 1], hence intuitively
the class of collusion channels satisfying Condition 2 remains large.
2) Fig. 5 shows the minimizing collusion channels p(k) for several different embedding distributions.
For each case it seems the continuous interpolation of p does converge to some g on [0, 1]. Indeed,
our following analysis still holds if we relax the restriction of (75) to
pz = g
(z
k
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
, ∀z ∈ {0, . . . , k}. (76)
The following reparameterization of the class (75) of collusion channels will simplify our analysis:
Definition 13. Let G and J be functions on [0, 1] defined as
G(w) , cos−1[1− 2g(w)] (77)
and
J(w) , w(1− w)[G′(w)]2 (78)
where g(w) satisfies Condition 2.
The outline of our asymptotic analysis is as follows: we fix w ∈ (0, 1) and we study the asymptotics of
I jointk (w,p). The binomial distribution of Z can be approximated by the Gaussian distribution with mean
kw and variance kw(1 − w), and by which we can approximate the dominating terms of I jointk (w,p).
Theorem 8 yields I jointk (w,p) ∼ J(w)/(k22 ln 2), where J is the transformation of g defined in (78).
The maximin game with J as the payoff function can be solved explicitly and hence the asymptotics of
the fingerprinting game can be obtained.
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The following lemmas will be useful for our analysis:
Lemma 5. [24, Sec. 2.5]
d(r ‖ s) = (r − s)
2
s(1− s)2 ln 2 +O(|r − s|
3). (79)
Lemma 6. For Z ∼ Binomial(k,w), we have
Pr[|Z − kw| ≥
√
k ln k] ≤ 1/k2. (80)
Proof: This is special case of Hoeffding’s inequality (see [25]).
Recall that the expectation of Y given W = w, which we denote by gk(w) in (67), can be written as
gk(w) , pY |W (1|w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)g
(z
k
)
where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1−w)k−z
is the binomial pmf which concentrates around its mean kw as k → ∞. gk is a polynomial in w of
degree ≤ k and is known as the Bernstein polynomial of order k of the function g [26]. By Condition
2 g is bounded and the second derivative g′′(w) exists, from Bernstein [26, §1.6] we have
gk(w) = g(w) +
w(1 − w)
2k
g′′(w) + o
(
1
k
)
. (81)
On the other hand, for z = k(w + ǫ), we have
pz = g
(z
k
)
= g(w + ǫ)
= g(w) + ǫg′(w) +O
(
ǫ2
)
. (82)
We now write the asymptotic approximation of I jointk in terms of g.
Firstly by the bounds presented in Sec. IV-C, we can focus on w and g such that I jointk (w,p) = Ω(1/k2).
Let δ =
√
ln k/k. We have
I jointk (w,p)
(a)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d(pz ‖ gk(w))
(b)∼ 1
k
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w) d(pz ‖ gk(w)) (83)
where (a) follows from (60) and (67) and (b) from Lemma 6.
Now if we let z = kw + η, where η = O(
√
k ln k), then by (82) we have
pz = g(w) +
η
k
g′(w) +O
(
η2
k2
)
(84)
and combining with (81) we have
pz − gk(w) = η
k
g′(w) +O
(
ln k
k
)
. (85)
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for η = ω(1). The contribution to (83) for η = O(1) decays exponentially with k and thus can be
neglected.
By (85) and Lemma 5, we have
d(pz ‖ gk(w)) = [pz − gk(w)]
2
gk(w)(1 − gk(w))2 ln 2 + o
(
1
k
)
(86)
and hence (83) yields
I jointk (w,p)
(a)∼ 1
k2 ln 2
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w)
[pz − gk(w)]2
gk(w)(1 − gk(w))
(b)∼ [g
′(w)]2
k3g(w)(1 − g(w))2 ln 2
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w) (z − kw)2
(c)∼ [g
′(w)]2w(1 − w)
k2g(w)(1 − g(w))2 ln 2
(d)
=
1
k22 ln 2
J(w) (87)
where (a) follows from (86), (b) from (81) and (85), (c) from Lemma 6, and (d) directly from the
definitions in (77) and (78). The following theorem concludes what we have proved thus far:
Theorem 8. Assume that Condition 2 is satisfied, then
I jointk (w,p) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
J(w), ∀w ∈ (0, 1). (88)
The joint fingerprinting game of (64) can now be approximated by the game with J as its payoff
function. We consider continuous probability distributions fW satisfying the following condition:
Condition 3. The pdf fW is continuous on [0, 1] with∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w) <∞. (89)
The following lemma shows the solution to the minimization problem with J as its payoff fuction.
Lemma 7. Let g(w) satisfy Condition 2 and fix fW satisfying Condition 3. Then
min
g
EfW [J(W )] = min
g
∫ 1
0
J(w)fW (w)dw = π
2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 −w)
]−1
(90)
where J is defined in (78). The minimum is achieved by
gopt(w) =
1
2
[
1− cos
(
π
∫ w
0
dv
fW (v)v(1−v)∫ 1
0
dv
fW (v)v(1−v)
)]
. (91)
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Proof: We have ∫
J(w)fW (w)dw =
∫ 1
0
w(1 −w)[G′(w)]2fW (w)dw
(a)
≥
[∫ 1
0 G
′(w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
dw
w(1−w)fW (w)
(b)
= π2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w)
]−1
(92)
where (a) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (b) follows from the boundary conditions
G(0) = 0 and G(1) = π following directly from Condition 2 and the definition of (77). Equality holds
in (a) when
G′opt(w) =
π∫ 1
0
dv
fW (v)v(1−v)
· 1
fW (w)w(1 − w) , (93)
which leads us to (91) by (77).
Corollary 4. For fW satisfying Condition 3, we have
C jointk (fW ,Pmark) ∼
π2
k22 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1 − w)
]−1
. (94)
Proof: This follows directly from Theorem 8 and Lemma 7.
Corollary 5.
C jointk (f
∗
W ,Pmark) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
. (95)
Proof: The right-hand side of (94) is maximized when fW = f∗W by Lemma 4. Also note that by
(91) we have gopt(w) = w, which leads us to the interleaving attack.
Corollary 6. The interleaving attack is an “equalizing strategy” for the colluders that makes the payoff
function J(w) asymptotically independent of w:
I jointk (w,p
∗) ∼ 1
k22 ln 2
, ∀w ∈ (0, 1). (96)
Proof: Let g(w) = w. Then p becomes the interleaving attack by (75) and J(w) ≡ 1 by Definition
13.
Corollary 7. The fingerprinting capacity under the marking assumption satisfies
C jointk (PW ,Pmark) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
. (97)
Furthermore, the arcsine distribution f∗W and the interleaving attack p∗ are the respective maximizing
and minimizing strategies that achieve the asymptotic capacity value.
Proof: The asymptotic relations (95) and (96) establish matching asymptotic lower and upper bounds
on C jointk (PW ,Pmark) respectively.
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Fig. 5. gopt(z/k) and minimizing collusion channels p(k) for k = 10, 20, and 30 and PW = Beta(θ, θ)
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Fig. 6. Jopt(w) and normalized payoff function I˜k(w,p(k)) for k = 10, 30, and 50 and PW = Beta(θ, θ)
B. Numerical Results for Beta Distributions
We now use the family of Beta distributions to illustrate the asymptotics of the joint fingerprinting
game. Let f θW be the pdf defined in (50). Condition 3 is satisfied for any θ ∈ (0, 1). For θ = 1/3, 1/2, and
2/3, we find the minimizing collusion channels p(k) for f θW and compare them with gopt(z/k) obtained
by (91). Fig. 5 shows that p(k)z does converge to gopt(z/k) as k →∞ as expected, which also rationalizes
our assumption of Condition 2.
Consider the normalized payoff function I˜ jointk (w,p) , k22 ln 2 · I jointk (w,p), which by Theorem 8 is
asymptotically close to J(w). Suppose Jopt is obtained by substituting gopt of (91) into (77) and (78).
Again for θ = 1/3, 1/2, and 2/3, we compare I˜ jointk (w,p(k)) with Jopt(w) in Fig. 6. As shown in the
figure, I˜ jointk (w,p
(k)) is asymptotically flat over (0, 1) when θ = 1/2, which is the case when f θW is
chosen properly. If θ < 1/2, which means f θW has too much weight around 0 and 1, then the colluders’
choice of gopt makes Jopt peak at w = 1/2. If on the contrary θ > 1/2, then too much weight around
1/2 is put on f θW , and gopt makes Jopt peaks at w = 0, 1.
C. Why Are the Arcsine Distribution and the Interleaving Attack Optimal for Large Coalitions?
The analysis and the numerical results above show not only that the asymptotic capacity is (k22 ln 2)−1,
but also that both the arcsine distribution for the maximizer and the interleaving attack for the minimizer
achieve the same asymptotic value. Such results are very interesting, and at the same time raise some
issues for further investigation. One topic concerns the regularity constraint (Condition 2)upon which
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the asymptotic analysis in Sec. V-A is based. However, it is reasonable to conjecture that the same
asymptotics hold without the regularity condition. Our numerical results indeed suggest this condition
may not be necessary. Moreover, it is important to mention that both the asymptotic lower bound on
capacity (see [23, Theorem 15]) and Corollary 6 (which contributes to the asymptotic upper bound) hold
without the regularity constraint.
Both the arcsine distribution and the interleaving attack have been extensively studied in the literature. In
2003, Tardos applied the arcsine distribution to fingerprinting [9]. How he fine-tuned his codes, however,
had been a mystery until ˇSkoric´ et al. [12] and Furon et al. [19] rationalized Tardos’ choices based on
Gaussian approximations. On the other hand, the interleaving attack has been frequently adopted to model
the collusion channel in the literature [7], [19], [6], but no conceptual reasoning has been proposed on why
it should be the coalition’s optimal choice. Fortunately, owing to the discovery of the capacity formulas
(Theorem 3), we can now study fingerprinting games from the information-theoretic point of view. In the
previous subsection, we established the optimality of these two strategies based on asymptotic methods.
Here we provide a statistical interpretation.
We may think of the (joint) fingerprinting capacity game as follows: the coalition is given k independent
observations X1, . . . ,Xk distributed according to an unknown distribution Bernoulli(W ) chosen at
random by the fingerprinting embedder from the family {Bernoulli(W ) : W ∈ [0, 1]} according to
a known prior distribution PW . Upon generating Y according to the conditional distribution pY |Z given
the sufficient statistic Z =
∑k
i=1Xi, the coalition suffers a loss I(Z;Y |W = w). The risk of the game
I(Z;Y |W ) is the average loss under PW .
As emphasized in previous works [4], [6], the choice of the embedding distribution PW , or prior
selection in statistician’s language, is crucial to the fingerprinting game. If no randomization takes place
[3], or equivalently, if the realization w is revealed to the pirates [6], then the maximin game value decays
exponentially with coalition size k (see (31)). Loosely speaking, the loss the pirates suffer is mainly due
to their error in estimating W . If they have a good estimation of the time-sharing random variable W ,
then the loss they suffer is small.
Jeffreys’ prior [27] is a “non-informative” prior that plays an important role in Bayesian statistics. Given
a family of distributions with an unknown parameter, Jeffreys’ prior is proportional to the square root
of the Fisher information. Conceptually speaking, Jeffreys’ prior is the “least-favorable” distribution in
regard to estimating that parameter. For the Bernoulli trial with the probability of success w as parameter,
the Fisher information is I(w) = [w(1− w)]−1 and thus Jeffreys’ prior is
f(w) ∝ 1√
w(1 − w) (98)
which is exactly the arcsine distribution!
The optimality of the interleaving attack is closely related to the concept of “equalizer rule” in game
theory. From Corollary 6, interleaving is the asymptotic equalizing strategy, which is the desirable attribute
we expect for a saddle-point solution. The optimal collusion channel depends on the prior by (91), and
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from the proof of Corollary 5, the interleaving attack is optimal under the arcsine distribution. Also observe
that the interleaving attack is the strategy where the colluders generate Y according to Bernoulli(Ŵ ),
where Ŵ = Z/k is the maximum likelihood estimator of W , which is asymptotically unbiased (as
k →∞) and has minimum asymptotic variance (equal to (kI(w))−1 = w(1 − w)/k).
Another interesting question is what are the asymptotics of the simple fingerprinting game. In Corollary
3, we established upper and lower bounds on Csimplek . Note that the upper bound is obtained by assuming
the interleaving attack for the coalition and it coincides with the asymptotic rate (k22 ln 2)−1 of C jointk . On
the other hand, Fig. 4(b) indicates that the optimal attack is actually quite different from the interleaving
attack. This suggests that the pirates can exploit the suboptimality of the single-user decoder and perform a
stronger attack. The study of the exact asymptotics of the simple fingerprinting game, is left as future work.
VI. SUMMARY
In this work, we proved new upper and lower bounds on the maximum achievable rate of binary
fingerprinting codes for arbitrary coalition size by studying the minimax and the maximin fingerprinting
games. We also provided asymptotic approximations of the capacity as well as both the fingerprinting
embedder and the coalition’s strategies. The results suggest that fingerprinting games under the Boneh-
Shaw marking assumption have a close relation to the Fisher information and Jeffreys’ prior for the
Bernoulli model.
APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF Csimplek (PW ,p
∗)
The function Isimplek (w,p∗) is indeed symmetric around w = 1/2 and has a global maximum at
w = 1/2 as suggested by numerical experiments in [6]. We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 8. For r ≥ s ≥ 0 and r + s ≤ 1, we have
d(r ‖ s) ≥ d(s ‖ r). (99)
Proof: The difference δ(r, s) between the two sides is
δ(r, s) = d(r ‖ s)− d(s ‖ r)
= r log
r
s
+ (1− r) log 1− r
1− s − s log
s
r
− (1− s) log 1− s
1− r
= (r + s) log
r
s
+ (2− r − s) log 1− r
1− s . (100)
Then
∂
∂s
δ(r, s) =
s− r
s(1− s) ln 2 + log
r(1− s)
s(1− r) (101)
and
∂2
∂s2
δ(r, s) =
(r − s)(1− 2s)
s2(1− s)2 ln 2 ≥ 0 (102)
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for all r ≥ s and r + s ≤ 1. Now when s ≤ r ≤ 1/2, we have ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣
s=r
= δ(r, r) = 0. Thus
∂
∂s
δ(r, s) ≤ 0 and thus δ(r, s) ≥ 0. When 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1−s, we have ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣
s=1−r
≤ 0 and δ(r, 1−r) =
0. Hence similarly ∂
∂s
δ(r, s) ≤ 0 and hence δ(r, s) ≥ 0. To prove the inequality ∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣
s=1−r
≤ 0, let
λ(r) ,
∂
∂s
δ(r, s)
∣∣∣∣
s=1−r
=
1− 2r
r(1− r) ln 2 + 2 log
r
1− r
and since λ(1/2) = 0 and λ′(r) = − (1−2r)2
r2(1−r)2 ln 2 ≤ 0 it follows that λ(r) ≤ 0 for all r ∈ [1/2, 1].
Now the payoff function can be written as
Isimplek (w,p
∗)
(a)
= wd(α1
′
p∗ ‖ α′p∗) + (1− w)d(α0′p∗ ‖ α′p∗)
(b)
= wd(w +
1−w
k
‖ w) + (1− w)d(w − w
k
‖ w) (103)
where (a) follows from (61) and (b) follows from (54) and Lemma 3, and by which we can easily verify
the symmetry property Isimplek (w,p
∗) = Isimplek (1−w,p∗). Hence it suffices to show that Isimplek (w,p∗)
is nondecreasing for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1/2. Taking the derivative of (103) with respect to w and after some
simplifications, we obtain
∂
∂w
Isimplek (w,p
∗) = d(w+ ‖ w−)− d(w− ‖ w+) (104)
where w+ , w + 1−w
k
and w− , w − w
k
. By Lemma 8 it follows that ∂
∂w
Isimplek (w,p
∗) ≥ 0 for all
w ∈ [0, 1/2] and hence Isimplek (w,p∗) achieves its maximum at w = 1/2.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Ehsan Amiri for illuminating discussions and helpful comments.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Moulin and J. A. O’Sullivan, “Information-theoretic analysis of information hiding,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 49,
no. 3, pp. 563–593, Mar. 2003.
[2] A. Somekh-Baruch and N. Merhav, “On the capacity game of private fingerprinting systems under collusion attacks,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 884–899, Mar. 2005.
[3] ——, “Achievable error exponents for the private fingerprinting game,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 1827–
1838, May 2007.
[4] P. Moulin. (2008, Dec.) Universal fingerprinting: Capacity and random-coding exponents. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0801.3837v2
[5] D. Boneh and J. Shaw, “Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 44, no. 5, pp.
1897–1905, Sept. 1998.
[6] T. Furon and L. Perez-Freire, “Worst case attacks against binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes,” Aug. 2009, preprint,
available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.3480v2.
[7] N. P. Anthapadmanabhan, A. Barg, and I. Dumer, “On the fingerprinting capacity under the marking assumption,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2678–2689, Jun. 2008.
[8] B. ˇSkoric´, S. Katzenbeisser, and M. U. Celik, “Symmetric Tardos fingerprinting codes for arbitrary alphabet sizes,” Designs,
Codes and Cryptography, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 137–166, Feb. 2008.
[9] G. Tardos, “Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes,” in Proc. 35th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2003),
2003, pp. 116–125.
May 28, 2018 DRAFT
30
[10] K. Nuida, M. Hagiwara, H. Watanabe, and H. Imai, “Optimization of Tardos’s fingerprinting codes in a viewpoint of
memory amount,” in Information Hiding: 9th Intl. Workshop, IH 2007, Saint Malo, France, Jun. 11-13, 2007, Revised
Selected Papers, ser. LNCS, vol. 4567. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 279–293.
[11] O. Blayer and T. Tassa, “Improved versions of Tardos’ fingerprinting scheme,” Designs, Codes and Cryptography, vol. 48,
no. 1, pp. 79–103, Jul. 2008.
[12] B. ˇSkoric´, T. Vladimirova, M. Celik, and J. Talstra, “Tardos fingerprinting is better than we thought,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 3663–3676, Aug. 2008.
[13] E. Amiri and G. Tardos, “High rate fingerprinting codes and the fingerprinting capacity,” in Proc. 20th Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2009), 2009, pp. 336–345.
[14] I. Dumer, “Equal-weight fingerprinting codes,” in Coding and Cryptology: Second Intl. Workshop, IWCC 2009, Zhangjiajie,
China, Jun. 1-5, 2009. Proceedings, ser. LNCS, vol. 5557. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009, pp. 43–51.
[15] W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, 3rd ed. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1968,
vol. II.
[16] L. A. Petrosjan and N. A. Zenkevich, Game Theory. River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 1996.
[17] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006.
[18] M. Sion, “On general minimax theorems,” Pacific J. Math., vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 171–176, 1958.
[19] T. Furon, A. Guyader, and F. Ce´rou, “On the design and optimization of Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting codes,” in
Information Hiding: 10th Intl. Workshop, IH 2008, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, May 19-21, 2008, Revised Selected Papers,
ser. LNCS, vol. 5284. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2008, pp. 341–356.
[20] D. P. Bertsekas, Nonlinear Programming. Belmont, MA: Athena Scientific, 1999.
[21] Y.-W. Huang and P. Moulin, “Saddle-point solution of the fingerprinting capacity game under the marking assumption,”
in Proc. IEEE Intl. Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2009), 2009, pp. 2256–2260.
[22] ——, “Capacity-achieving fingerprint decoding,” in Proc. First IEEE Intl. Workshop on Information Forensics and Security
(WIFS 2009), 2009, pp. 51–55.
[23] E. Amiri, “Fingerprinting codes: Higher rates, quick accusations,” Ph.D. dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 2010.
[24] F. Bavaud, “Information theory, relative entropy and statistics,” in Formal Theories of Information: From Shannon to
Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information, ser. LNCS, vol. 5363. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag, 2009, pp. 54–78.
[25] W. Hoeffding, “Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables,” J. Amer. Statistical Assoc., vol. 58, no.
301, pp. 13–30, Mar. 1963.
[26] G. G. Lorentz, Bernstein Polynomials, 2nd ed. New York, NY: AMS Bookstore, 1986.
[27] J. M. Bernardo and A. F. M. Smith, Bayesian Theory. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
May 28, 2018 DRAFT
